Curator Congress: How Proposed Legislation Adds Protection to Cultural Object Loans From Foreign States by Shield, Jennifer M.
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology 
& Intellectual Property Law 
Volume 23 
Issue 2 Spring 2013 Article 6 
Curator Congress: How Proposed Legislation Adds Protection to 
Cultural Object Loans From Foreign States 
Jennifer M. Shield 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip 
Recommended Citation 
Jennifer M. Shield, Curator Congress: How Proposed Legislation Adds Protection to Cultural Object Loans 
From Foreign States, 23 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 427 (2013) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss2/6 
This Legislative Updates is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized 
editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CURATOR CONGRESS: HOW PROPOSED
LEGISLATION ADDS PROTECTION TO
CULTURAL OBJECT LOANS FROM FOREIGN
STATES
1. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, people around the world have benefited
from the opportunity to observe cultural works and objects in
person because of loaned exhibitions from a foreign institution.
Traditionally, these loans transpired with the faith that such
important items would be returned hassle-free to the loaning
institution. However, the United States judiciary has shaken this
belief to its core, affecting the willingness of foreign nations to
lend exhibitions to United States institutions. Recently, when
foreign states have loaned items to United States museums, they
increasingly worry about finding themselves involved in
expensive, time-consuming litigation regarding the loaned objects.
To avoid the jurisdiction of the United States courts and the
ensuing litigation, foreign state-owned museums may be giving
pause when deciding whether or not to lend exhibitions to the
United States. In 2012, Congress took the first steps towards
remedying this hesitation with the introduction of the Foreign
Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunities Clarification Act.
The purpose of this article is to explore the Foreign Cultural
Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act ("FCEJICA"
or "Bill"), which aims to immunize foreign state action when their
state-owned institutions loan works of art and culturally significant
objects to museums in the United States. Despite Congress's
attempt to protect cultural loans from foreign states to the United
States through the FCEJICA, this article concludes that the Bill
should not be made law as currently written because it
unintentionally conveys the diplomatic messages that the United
States does not view some worldwide injustices as significant, and
that the United Sates condones the theft or appropriation of
culturally significant items for the viewing and cultural benefit of
the American people.
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Section II of this article will discuss the background that
inspired the Bill's introduction, beginning with Part A, which lays
the historical foundation of foreign state immunity in the United
States. Part B will discuss the Federal Sovereigns Immunities Act
("FSIA") of 1976 and set forth the relevant provisions, the
judiciary's interpretation and application of them, and related
immunity legislation applicable to the lending of culturally
significant objects. Finally, Part C will present Malewicz v. City of
Amsterdam, a seminal case that impacted lending from foreign
state operated museums to United States institutions.
Section III will examine the FCEJICA itself and provide a brief
synopsis of the Bill's provisions.
Section IV will analyze the impact of the FCEJICA. After a
brief overview, Part A first addresses the reasons for adopting the
FCEJICA and the positive impacts the Bill would have if adopted
as is. Part B then explores the reasons for tabling the Bill and the
drawbacks of adopting the FCEJICA as originally proposed.
Finally, Part C explains why the Bill should not be adopted as was
originally proposed.
Section V concludes the article by suggesting some alterations
for improvement if the Bill is introduced again.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Foreign State Immunity Prior to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act
International law has established that foreign sovereign
immunity is an undisputed principle of international relations.'
This traditional principle dictates that a foreign state enjoys
absolute immunity from lawsuits in another nation, regardless of
whether the foreign state's actions were commercial or public.2
The United States has long recognized and honored this principle,
1. NOUT VAN WOUDENBERG, STATE IMMUNITY AND CULTURAL OBJECTS ON
LOAN 108, n.13 (2012).
2. Id.
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applying it as early as 1781 in Moitez v. The South Carolina.
Subsequently in 1812, the Supreme Court expressly recognized
this immunity theory and therefore, refused to exercise jurisdiction
over a French warship. In practice, foreign states would request
sovereign immunity through the United States Department of
State, who would then file a suggestion of immunity with the
court, which the courts then accordingly relied upon.' Thus, until
1952, foreign states possessed absolute immunity for actions in the
United States upon request.
In 1952, Jack B. Tate, the Legal Advisor to the United States
Department of State, sent a letter to the United States Justice
Department, now known simply as the Tate Letter.' This letter
informed the Justice Department that the Department of State
would no longer apply the absolute immunity theory, and instead
endorse and apply a restrictive foreign sovereign immunity
theory.! Under this prescribed restrictive immunity theory, a
foreign state's immunity is limited only to jure imperii (sovereign
or public acts); thus, a foreign state's jure gestionis (private acts)
are fair game for legal action.! This shift in immunity theories has
been attributed to a large increase in governments engaging in
commercial activities, which necessitated a forum to resolve
disputes arising out of those new activities.9
3. Id. (citing Fed. Cas. No. 9,697, 1 Bee 422 (Admiralty Court of Pa., 1781,
Francis Hopkinson, J.) (holding "that mariners enlisting on board a ship of war,
or vessel belonging to a sovereign independent state, cannot libel against a ship
for wages due.")).
4. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, II U.S. 116, 147 (1812). The Schooner
Exchange, an American trading ship, was seized by order of Napoleon
Bonaparte and turned into a French warship. Id. at 116. When the ship
eventually docked in Philadelphia, the original owners filed an action seeking to
reclaim the ship. Id. The District Court denied jurisdiction over the suit, but the
Circuit Court reversed. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court and
affirmed the District Court, denying jurisdiction on the grounds of absolute
sovereign immunity. Id. at 147.
5. WOUDENBERG, supra note 1, at 109.
6. Patty Gerstenblith & Bonnie Czegledi, International Cultural Property,
39 INT'L LAW. 493, 494-95 (2005).
7. Id. at 494-95.
8. Id. at 495.
9. WOUDENBERG, supra note 1, at 109.
2013] 429
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However, the Tate Letter had a procedural flaw: it failed to
provide the Justice Department with any specific criteria for
implementing the new theory; specifically, guidelines for
distinguishing between public acts and private acts.o As a result,
the Justice Department applied the Tate Letter inconsistently due
to this lack of clarity; in practice, the Tate Letter had little effect
since the lack of guidelines required courts to still rely on the
Department of State's immunity suggestions." Additionally, in
the name of diplomacy, foreign nations began to pressure the
Department of State to request immunity in cases in which the
actions at issue in the suit would not be considered immune under
a restrictive theory, thus further muddying the distinction between
which sovereign acts were public or private.12 In cases where the
foreign State did not ask the Department of State for immunity,
courts were left to determine if immunity should be applied based
only on past Department of State immunity suggestions." The
ineffectiveness of the Tate Letter was cemented when a court
found that the letter did not provide sufficient instruction on how a
court should differentiate between foreign state's public acts and
its private acts and thus, could not be relied on by the judiciary. 4
This prompted the Supreme Court in Victory Transport Inc. v.
Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes to set forth a
judicial guideline of what foreign state acts would qualify as
sovereign acts or public acts, and therefore, were subject to
immunity; however, despite the fact the courts now had specific
criteria to examine, the Department of State continued to issue
immunity suggestions, so ultimately the process sat in an
unpredictable limbo." After twenty years of inconsistency and
10. Id. at 109-10.
11. Id. at 109.
12. Gerstenbilth & Czegledi, supra note 6, at 495.
13. Id.
14. WOUDENBERG, supra note 1, at 109-10 (citing Victory Transport Inc. v.
Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 359 (2d
Cir. 1964)).
15. The Second Circuit ruled that "acts [jure imperii] are generally limited to
the following categories: (1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an
alien, (2) legislative acts, such as nationalization, (3) acts concerning the armed
forces, (4) Acts concerning diplomatic activity, (5) public loans." Id. at 360.
430
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confusion, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act on October 21, 1976.16
B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") codified the
Department of State's restrictive immunity theory and the
exemptions from foreign state immunity that would be recognized
by the United States. 7 The FSIA added additional clarity to the
foreign immunity process by making the judiciary the sole decider
of whether a foreign state's actions do or do not qualify for
immunity." The FSIA was codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1332(a), 1391(f), and 1601-1611." Today, the FSIA is the sole
grounds for a United States court to obtain jurisdiction over
foreign states.20 Under the FSIA, the foreign state is presumed
immune from jurisdiction unless the plaintiff proves that one of the
exceptions is applicable.2' While the FSIA serves as the sole basis
for determining whether sovereign immunity applies in all cases, it
has particularly important applications to foreign state-owned
museums' lending of artwork and culturally significant artifacts to
institutions in the United States. Due to the courts' interpretation
of the definition of commercial activity within the FSIA's
expropriation exception, foreign state-owned museums may not
receive immunity when lending to institutions within the United
States.
Victory Transport, 336 F.2d at 360. Everything else would be consideredjure
gestionis. Id.
16. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1601-1611 (2006).
17. WOUDENBERG, supra note 1, at 110, n.23.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
19. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1601-1611 (1976).
20. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp,, 488 U.S. 428, 434
(1989).
21. Freund v. Republic of France, 592 F. Supp. 2d 540, 553 (S.D.N.Y.
2008), aff'd sub nom. Freund v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais,
391 F. App'x 939 (2d Cir. 2010).
2013] 431
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1. Purpose of the FSIA
As declared in § 1602, the objective of the FSIA is to ensure that
the courts will decide foreign state immunity claims. 2 2
Additionally, § 1602 states the purpose of this determination is that
"[u]nder international law, states are not immune from the
jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities
are concerned, and their commercial property may be levied upon
for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in
connection with their commercial activities."2 3 Congress
concluded that the United States courts are the best vessel for
determining immunity claims because of their ability to apply the
principles evenly and to serve justice to the interests of both the
litigant and the foreign state.24
Importantly, the FSIA recognized that immunity may be subject
to existing treaties and agreements, and thus added § 1604, which
provides that in the event of a dispute, agreements and treaties
made prior to the FSIA would govern.25 Therefore, if a preexisting
agreement or treaty is silent, the FSIA governs because the
preexisting treaty exception will only be enforced when there is an
express conflict between the immunity provisions in that
agreement or treaty and the FSIA.26
One of the major issues regarding the FSIA was whether it
applied to claims of behavior that predated the adoption of the Act
in 1976, and even claims arising from behavior before the United
States' shift to restrictive immunity in the Tate Letter in 1952.27
Claims arising out of the World War II era highlighted the issue.28
In Republic of Austria v. Altmann, the Supreme Court decisively
ruled that the FSIA applies retroactively to claims arising before
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id § 1604
26. Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306,
310 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996).
27. 1 VED. P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 3:4 (2012).
2 8. Id.
432
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its adoption. 29 The Court reasoned that the preamble of the FSIA
stating that immunity would apply "henceforth" indicated
Congress's intent that the restrictive immunity apply to all legal
claims after the adoption of the Act.30
2. The Expropriation Exception
Section 1605 lists the exceptions to a foreign state's
jurisdictional immunity in the United States." Importantly,
Section 1605(a)(3) states as follows:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the
States in any case-. . . (3) in which rights in
property taken in violation of international law are
in issue and that property or any property
exchanged for such property is present in the
United States in connection with a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state; or that property or any property
exchanged for such property is owned or operated
by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state
and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a
commercial activity in the United States.3 2
This section is commonly referred to as the expropriation
exception. The United States is the only sovereign state to have
such an exception." The section essentially presents two elements
that must be satisfied when examining an expropriation exception
case. The first element requires (a) that the defendant is a foreign
state, or, more typically, that the defendant is an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state, (b) that the property in question,
or property exchanged for it, is owned or operated by the
29. Altman v. Republic of Austria, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004).
30. Id. at 679.
31. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a).
32. Id. §1605(a)(3).
33. WOUDENBERG, supra note 1, at 116.
2013] 433
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defendant, and (c) that the defendant is engaged in commercial
activity in the United Stafes.34 The second element requires that
the property be expropriated in violation of international law."
Immunity is a threshold issue because it relates to the court's
subject matter jurisdiction, and thus, should be raised before filing
a responsive pleading, so as to avoid waiver of immunity.36 The
foreign state must make a prima facie showing that it is a foreign
state under the FSIA; the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show
that the FSIA's expropriation exception is applicable.3 7 If the
plaintiff asserts some facts showing the exception is applicable, the
burden shifts back to the foreign state to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the expropriation exception is
inapplicable." Thus, while the plaintiff must produce evidence
tending to prove that there is no immunity under the expropriation
exception, the foreign state actually bears the burden of
persuasion.39 However, if the original pleadings are insufficient,
the court may dismiss the compliant sua sponte for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.40
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
35. Id. See Siderman de Blake v. Rep. of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 711 (9th
Cir. 1992) (stating that there are three criteria under international law for a
taking to be valid and thus not within the FSIA's expropriation exception: (1)
the expropriation serves a public purpose, (2) no aliens were discriminated
against or singled out for regulation by the state; and (3) there was just
compensation).
36. Gutch v. Fed. Rep. of Germany, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2006),
aff'd, 255 F. App'x 524 (D.C. Cir. 2007). A foreign state's waiver of immunity
may be either express or implied under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). Id. Implied
waiver exists when: (1) a foreign state agrees to arbitration in another country,
(2) it is agreed that the laws of another foreign state governs a contract, and (3)
when a foreign state files a responsive pleading without raising an immunity
defense. Id.
37. de Cespel v. Republic of Hungary, 808 F. Supp. 2d 113, 127 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
3 8. Id.
39. NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 27.
40. See Zapolski v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 09 CIV. 1503(BMC), 2010
WL 1816327 (E.D.N.Y. May 4, 2010), aff'd, 425 F. App'x 5 (2d Cir. 2011)
(dismissing a compliant sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
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Furthermore, some courts have held that the plaintiff, in addition
to showing the above elements, must have pursued and exhausted
all other remedies available in order to bring an expropriation
claim in United States courts.4' Other courts disagree and have
held that the FSIA does not require the element of exhaustion of
remedies.42 Without a Supreme Court holding on the issue, the
exception technically then does not have an exhaustion of
remedies requirement since § 1605(a)(3) is silent on an exhaustion
requirement.43
Under the first requirement, because of the novelty and
importance of the FSIA, and to avoid the ambiguity issues of the
Tate Letter, Congress defined the terms "foreign state" and
"commercial activity." The FSIA sets forth that a foreign state
"includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state."" An agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state is meant to include any entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or
otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political
subdivision therefore, or a majority of whose shares
or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, and
41. See Millicom Int'l Cellular v. Republic of Costa Rica, 995 F. Supp. 14,
23 (D.D.C. 1998) (precluding claimant from recovering from Costa Rican
government when claimant had not exhausted recovery avenues in the Costa
Rica Judiciary). But see McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, CIV.A.
82-220 TAF, 1997 WL 361177 at * 15 n.25 (D.D.C. June 23, 1997), rev'd in
part sub nom. McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F.3d
1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001), vacated in part, 320 F.3d 280 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (allowing
claimant to exert claim without exhausting remedies because the requirement
does not apply when (1) the remedies available are clearly inadequate, or (2) the
foreign state clearly denies responsibility in the injury claimed).
42. See Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 517 F. Supp. 2d 322, 334 (D.D.C.
2007); Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2009),
dismissed in part, aff'd in part en banc, 590 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2009), cert
denied 131 S. Ct. 3057 (2011).
43. Crowell & Moring LLP, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: 2010
Year in Review, 17 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 637, 660-61 (2011).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
2013] 435
9
Shield: Curator Congress: How Proposed Legislation Adds Protection to Cul
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXIII:427
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the
United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (e)
of this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country.45
This distinction may sometimes require the courts to determine
if the entity is a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality
because the applicable statutory rules may differ depending on the
classification.4 6 In this situation, the courts will apply a "core-
functions" test.4 7 Under this test, if the core function of the entity
is considered governmental, then it is classified as a foreign state;
however, if the core function of the entity is considered
commercial, then it is classified as an agency or instrumentality.4 8
The other crucial definition in the FSIA with respect to the
expropriation exception is commercial activity. Congress defined
commercial activity as "either a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The
commercial character of an activity shall be determined by
reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose."49
Additionally, "a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by a foreign state means commercial activity carried on by
such state and having substantial contact with the United States.""
Congress focused the analysis of commercial activity on the nature
of the action, not the purpose, because some acts by nature are
commercial even if they are being done to further a governmental
purpose.'
For example, in Westfield v. Federal Republic of Germany, the
court explored Congress's meaning of commercial activity within
the expropriation exception.5 2 In Wesfield, Nazis had seized and
45. Id. § 1603(b).
46. WOUDENBERG,supra note 1, at 113.
47. Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 151 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
48. Jacobsen v. Oliver, 451 F. Supp. 2d 181, 196 (D.D.C. 2006).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
50. Id. § 1603(e).
51. Crowell & Moring LLP, supra note 43, at 648-49.
52. Westfield v. Fed. Rep. of Ger., 633 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2011).
436
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auctioned off the art collection of Walter Westfield even though
Westfield unsuccessfully tried to remove the collection to the
United States." Westfield's heirs brought suit in the United States,
and Germany moved to dismiss the case due to lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the FSIA.54 The Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's grant of Germany's motion to
dismiss." The court reasoned the Germany was immune from suit
because the State's activities did not satisfy the commercial
activity requirement of the FSIA.5 6 Although the Westfield heirs
argued that the commercial activity directly affected the United
States, because of the prevention of assets reaching the United
States and the United States art market, the Court found that these
effects were not immediate consequences of Germany's actions
and therefore, not direct effects." Thus, although the auction of
the paintings was a commercial activity, there was no substantial,
direct effect to the United States market, meaning that the
expropriation exception did not apply."
As for the second requirement of the expropriation exception,
Congress did not formally define a taking under the expropriation
exception. However, the legislative history of the FSIA reveals
that Congress intended a taking in violation of international law to
be "a nationalization or expropriation of property without payment
of the prompt, adequate and effective compensation required by
international law."59 A taking in violation of international law
includes "takings which are arbitrary or discriminatory in
nature."60 But for a governmental taking to potentially be in
violation of international law, it has to be property taken from a
noncitizen; taking property for a state's own citizen does not fall
within the expropriation exception.' The distinction between
53. Id. at 412.
54. Id. at 413.
55. Id at 418.
56. Id. at 417.
57. Westfield, 633 F. 3d at 417.
58. Id. at 418.
59. WOUDENBERG, supra note 1, at 115, n.45 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487,
at 7-8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605-06).
60. Id.
61. de Cespel, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 129.
2013] 437
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takings from citizens and noncitizens can give rise to issues of
where the property was taken, forcing courts to determine the
location of the taking since the taking has to be in violation of
international law for the expropriation exception to potentially
apply.62 Additionally, some courts have found that property within
the meaning of the FSIA only includes tangible property.63
However, the courts have still recognized that there are some
exceptions to what constitutes a taking in violation of international
law. For example, in Orkin v. Switzerland, the court held that the
there was no taking of the item since the owner sold the artwork to
a private individual.' Here, Orkin's grandmother sold a Van
Gogh drawing to a Swiss art collector below market value in order
to gain funds to flee the country during the Nazi era." The court
held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under FSIA to hear
the case.66 The court found that the drawing was passed to a
private individual, not a sovereign or an agent operating on behalf
of a sovereign.67 Since the drawing was acquired by a private
individual, it was not a taking and thus, not within the
expropriation exception."
A noteworthy expropriation exception takings case is Agudas
Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Federation et al.69
Put simply, the Chabad religious organization claimed (1) that the
62. 1 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 3:38 (2012).
63. See Rong v. Liaoning Provincial Gov't, 362 F. Supp. 2d 83, 98 (D.D.C.
2005), aff'd sub nom. Rong v. Liaoning Province Gov't, 452 F.3d 883 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (asserting that the FSIA applies when tangible property is at issue,
but was resolved on different grounds); contra Nemariam v. Fed. Dem. Rep. of
Eth., 491 F.3d 470, 480 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the expropriation
exception applies to both tangible and intangible property).
64. Orkin v. Swiss Confederation, 770 F. Supp. 2d 612, 616 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
65. Id. at 614.
66. Id. at 616-17.
67. Id. at 616.
68. Id. at 616-17.
69. Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed'n, 466 F. Supp. 2d 6
(D.D.C. 2006), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part, 528 F.3d 934 (D.C.
Cir. 2008); 729 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D.D.C. 2010); 798 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D.D.C.
2011); and CIV. 05-1548 RCL, 2013 WL 164071 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2013).
438
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organization's property was located in Russia and in the
possession of the Russian government, (2) that one part of the
collection had been taken by the Russians during the Bolshevik
Revolution, and (3) that the rest had been taken by Nazi agents
during World War II and claimed as war booty by Russia at the
end of the war. 0 The Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's jurisdiction under the expropriation exception of the FSIA
and found that Russia was not immune from Chabad's claims.
Russia responded by filing a "Statement with Respect to Further
Participation" that stated it considered the court to have no
authority over Russia's property and declined to continue
participating in the litigation.72 Subsequently, the District Court
entered a default judgment against the Russian Federation after
finding that the Chabad had successfully showed the elements of
the takings exception and ordered the Russians to surrender the
property.7 ' The Russians considered the court order "a 'rude
violation' of international law" and cancelled all loans from
Russian State-owned museums to American museums and
institutions.7 ' Because Russia has not responded to the default
judgment or surrendered the property, the District Court entered
sanctions on January 13, 2013 of $50,000 per day until the default
judgment order is complied with.
3. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Seizure of
Property
If the property has come within the jurisdiction of the United
States courts and one of the FSIA exceptions applies, the property
in question may still be exempt from seizure. 6 Under the
"Immunity from seizure under judicial process of cultural objects
imported for temporary exhibit or display" (now referred to as
70. Agudas Chasidei Chabad, 466 F. Supp. at 12-13.
71. Agudas Chasidei Chabad, 528 F.3d at 955.
72. Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed'n, 729 F. Supp. 2d 141,
144 (D.D.C. 2010).
73. Id. at 148.
74. WOUDENBERG, supra note 1, at 132.
75. Chabadv. Russian Fed'n, CIV. 05-1548 RCL, 2013 WL 164071, at *6.
76. NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 62.
2013] 439
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Immunity From Seizure Act, or "IFSA," 22 U.S.C § 2459), a
United States institution can apply for immunity status for an
object that it receives on loan from a foreign state-owned
institution provided the loan is (1) temporary and not-for-profit,
(2) the President or his designee determines that the object is
culturally significant and the display of such object is in the
national interest, and (3) notice is published in the Federal
Register. If the object is granted immunity, no state or federal
court can exercise judicial process over the object. Courts have
ruled, however, that an object's immunity does not bar the foreign
state from suit, only from the seizure of the object.79
Under the IFSA, the President has the power to determine and
declare that works and objects on temporary exhibition are
culturally significant and of national interest, and therefore, upon
compliance with the other provisions, are immune from seizure by
United States courts." This power has since been delegated to the
Department of State: United States institutions must apply for this
immunity through the Department of State, and await the
Department's determination and announcement in the Federal
Register on whether the object will receive immunity from
seizure." Importantly, the United States institution must submit an
application six weeks before importation of the object, at a
minimum.82 The application process requires that the United
States receive the loan to provide general information (e.g., the
objects to be loaned, their cultural significance, and the schedule
of exhibition), as well as any agreements between the foreign
owner and the United States institution, including the loan
77. 22 U.S.C. § 2459(a) (2006).
78. Id.
79. See source cited infra, note 91, at 311-12.
80. 22 U.S.C. § 2459(a).
81. Exec. Order 12,047, 43 Fed. Reg. 13,359 (1978), as amended by Exec.
Order 12,388, 47 Fed. Reg. 46,245 (1982); Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681.
82. Check List for Applicant, U.S. DEP'T STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/1/
3196.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).
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agreement and any commercial agreements." Intriguingly, the
application is also requires that it contain the following statement:
The applicant certifies that it has undertaken
professional inquiry - including independent, multi-
source research - into the provenance of the objects
proposed for determination of cultural significance
and national interest. The applicant certifies further
that it does not know or have reason to know of any
circumstances with respect to any of the objects that
would indicate the potential for competing claims
of ownership [,except as described below. For the
objects for which circumstances exist that would
indicate the potential for competing claims of
ownership, the following is a description of such
circumstances and the likelihood any such claim
would succeed.]84
If applicable, a description of any knowledge of current or past
claims over ownership would follow this statement."
The importance of applying for immunity from seizure under the
IFSA was demonstrated in the case United States v. Portrait of
Wally, in which works on loan to the New York Museum of
Modem Art (MoMA) from the Leopold Museum in Vienna were
in practice seized by the state courts.86 The MoMA did not seek
83. Id. This site contains the full checklist and walkthrough of how to apply
for immunity and what is required in the application.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See U.S. v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Just days before Portrait of Wally left the MoMA to continue on an exhibition
tour from the Leopold Museum, the MoMA received a letter urging the MoMA
to not return the works in question until ownership had been investigated and
determined. WOUDENBERG, supra note 1, at 185-86. The MoMA declined and
subsequently received a grand jury subpoena forbidding them to ship Portrait of
Wally and one other painting due to issues regarding the true ownership of the
works. United States v. Portrait of Wally, 105 F. Supp. 2d 288, 290 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), amended, 99 CIV. 9940 (MBM), 2000 WL 1890403 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28,
2000). While the rest of the exhibition continued on tour, the MoMA
successfully squashed the subpoena. People v. Museum of Modern Art: In the
2013] 441
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immunity from seizure through the federal system because they
believed a New York statute sufficiently safeguarded the works
from seizure." The dispute in Portrait of Wally could have been
avoided if the work was under the protection of the IFSA and not
the pre-emptable New York law. In fact, following the litigation,
the New York District Attorney admitted that he would have been
unable to subpoena the work if it had been subject to the protection
granted by federal authorities under the IFSA."
C. Malewicz v. City ofAmsterdam
In Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, the court's holding indicated
for the first time that while an object in dispute may be immune
from seizure, the foreign owner/lender might still be subject to
litigation. The court reached this conclusion after finding
jurisdiction under the FSIA's expropriation exception over the
Matter of the Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpeona Duces Tecum Served
on the Museum of Modern Art, 667 N.Y.S. 2d 872 (Sup. Ct. 1998). However,
during the nearly two year litigation two lenders cancelled an agreement to loan
paintings for fear that the works may be seized and not returned.
WOUDENBERG, supra note 1, at 189. Additionally, thirteen museum directors
had submitted brief amicus curiae on behalf of the MoMA for fear of a chilling
loans from foreign museums. Id. Just as the two paintings were to be returned,
a federal seizure warrant was issued for Portrait of Wally and civil forfeiture
proceedings under the National Stolen Property Act were commenced. United
States v. Portrait of Wally, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 290. The court ruled that painting
was not legally recovered, that the painting was subject to confiscation, and the
forfeiture actions were to proceed. WOUDENBERG, supra note 1, at 192. After
discovery, the court found that there was a triable issue of fact of whether the
museum knew the pieces were stolen when they were sent to the United States
as this affected the requisite intent for conversion. U.S. v. Portrait of Wally, 663
F. Supp. 2d 232, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Ultimately the claim was settled, the
suit was dismissed, and the painting was released back to the Leopold Museum.
WOUDENBERG, supra note 1, at 194. The heirs were paid $19,000,000 US and
released their claim to the Portrait of Wally. Id. Additionally, the work had to
be exhibited at the Museum of Jewish Heritage before returning to Vienna, and
all future displays of the Portrait of Wally, including while at the Leopold
Museum, had to be accompanied by a sign telling the story behind the painting,
including the theft from the true owner by a Nazi agent. Id. at 194-95.
87. WOUDENBERG, supra note 1, at 194.
88. Id. at 195.
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foreign state-owned museum that was allegedly in possession of
stolen works.89 The court's finding of jurisdiction was rooted in
the determination that the lending off artwork to the United States
had sufficient contacts to satisfy the commercial activity
requirement within the expropriation exception.o This was the
first time that a court held the loan of the object itself could satisfy
the commercial activity requirement of the expropriation
exception.
Kazimir Malewicz was a Russian artist that had traveled to
Berlin in 1927 to exhibit a substantial number of his paintings."
Malewicz unexpectedly returned to Russia, but first entrusted his
painting to four friends in Germany.92 After the exhibition closed,
all of the paintings were shipped to Dr. Alexander Dorner for
subsequent storage and safe-keeping, but during Nazi Germany,
Dr. Dorner distributed the painting collection to several locations
for safekeeping: the Museum of Modern Art in New York received
several for safekeeping; Dr. Dorner took two paintings with him
(that were subsequently bequeathed to the Busch-Reisnger
Museum at Harvard University); and Mr. Haring received the
remainder for safekeeping in Berlin." Mr. Hring constantly and
continuously denied that he was the owner of the works and
asserted that he was only the custodian for the safekeeping of the
collection, but eventually agreed to lend the works to the Stedelijk
Museum in Amsterdam.94 In 1956, the City of Amsterdam entered
into a loan agreement with Mr. Hiring for the Malewicz
Collection, and subsequently exercised a contractual option to
purchase the collection in 1958."
In 2003, fourteen of the eighty-four works in the Malewicz
Collection were on temporary exhibition at the Guggenheim
Museum in New York City and then the Menil Collection in
89. Malewicz, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
90. Id.
91. Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 301 (D.D.C.
2005).
92. Id.
93. Id. Upon request from the heirs, the Museum of Modem Art returned
one of the works, while the Busch-Reisinger Museum returned both works. Id.
94. Id. at 301-02.
95. Id. at 302-03.
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Houston."6 Prior to the exportation of the works, the United States
institutions requested immunity from seizure for the works
pursuant to the IFSA." Despite the Malewicz heirs' objections,
the Department of State granted the immunity request after
determining that the collection was culturally significant and the
exhibitions were in the interest of the nation." Two days before
the final exhibit closed, the Malewicz heirs filed suit against the
City of Amsterdam seeking return of title of the works and
damages." The City subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on
jurisdictional grounds.' 0 Additionally, the United States Attorney
General filed a Supplemental Statement of Interest regarding the
works' immunity from seizure.o' Because the works in dispute
had IFSA immunity, they were shipped with the rest of the
collection to the next stop of the tour.102
Upon the first hearing of the case, the court made several
findings before denying Amsterdam's motion to dismiss.0 3 First,
the court found that Amsterdam was a foreign state within the
meaning of the FSIA and therefore, would be immune unless the
expropriation exception was applicable.'0 4 Moving to the takings
element, the court found that Amsterdam did not admit
responsibility of the actions, just the illegality of them.o' The
court also found that Amsterdam's argument of exhaustion of
remedies was not a sufficient basis for dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds because the Dutch statute of limitations may bar the suit
in the Netherlands.'06 Next, the court examined the first element,
specifically the presence in the United States factor, and found that
96. Id. at 303.
97. Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 298, 303 (D.D.C.
2005).
98. Id.
99. Id
100. Id.
101. Id. at 304.
102. Id. at 303.
103. Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 298, 315 (D.D.C.
2005).
104. Id. at 306.
105. Id. at 308.
106. Id.
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filing the complaint while the works were in the United States
sufficiently satisfies the presence requirement.'"0 Additionally, the
court found that Amsterdam's and the United States Attorney
General's argument and reliance on the works' immunity from
seizure was misplaced because the action was for declaration of
title and damages, not seizure.'s Finally, the court found that the
loan of the works was a commercial activity, but that the record
was insufficient to show that the loan had substantial contact with
the United States.' Thus, the Court denied the motion and gave
the parties the option of supplementing the record regarding the
substantial contacts if they so desired."'
On re-hearing in 2007, the district court held that Amsterdam's
contacts with the United States regarding the loan were substantial,
and therefore, jurisdiction under the FSIA was established."'
According to the court, the dispositive facts indicating substantial
contacts included (1) that Amsterdam knew the works would be
displayed in the United States despite knowledge of the heirs'
takings claim, (2) that Amsterdam received over $25,000
combined from the United States museums for the exhibitions, (3)
the Stedelijk's insistence that expert handlers travel with the
artwork, and (4) that the Stedelijk sent several employees
(including the Chief Curator for Paintings and Sculptures) to
accompany the artwork.1 2 Therefore, Amsterdam was not immune
under the expropriation exception of FSIA, the United States
courts had jurisdiction, and the motion to dismiss was denied."3
Subsequently, the heirs and the City of Amsterdam settled out of
court.' 14 The settlement agreement stated that the heirs would
receive five important paintings from the Malewicz collection
while Amsterdam would retain the rest."' Additionally,
107. Id. at 311-12.
108. Id. at 312.
109. Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 298, 314-15
(D.D.C. 2005).
110. Id. at 315-16.
111. Malewicz, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
112. Id. at 332.
113. Id. at 340.
114. WOUDENBERG, supra note 1, at 181.
115. Id.
2013] 445
19
Shield: Curator Congress: How Proposed Legislation Adds Protection to Cul
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXIII:427
Amsterdam would acknowledge that the heirs had title in those
five artworks, while the heirs would acknowledge Amsterdam's
title in the remaining works."'
As a result of Malewicz, the current interpretation of commercial
activity within the expropriation exception has changed: if taken
property is or has been in the United States as a part of enterprise,
then the commercial activity element can be satisfied."' This is
significant because, as a result of the analysis in Malewicz, it can
lead to the finding of sufficient commercial activities when
museums or institutions display foreign property on loan, such as
artwork or cultural objects, from foreign states or
instrumentalities."' This judicial interpretation that lending
artwork is a sufficient commercial activity under the expropriation
exception creates a disconnect between the FSIA and the IFSA."9
If an object or piece of art was granted immunity under the IFSA,
it cannot be seized or attached in a lawsuit.'20 However, since
merely loaning a work to the United States satisfies the FSIA
jurisdictional requirement, the foreign state may still be subject to
suit in the United States with regards to the object. 2 ' Therefore,
while the piece itself may not be tied up in litigation, the foreign
state will be in litigation related to the piece. This outcome
contradicts the underlying immunity intention of the IFSA.
III. THE FOREIGN CULTURAL EXCHANGE JURISDICTIONAL
IMMUNITY CLARIFICATION ACT
The Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdiction Immunity
Clarification Act ("FCEJICA" or "Bill") was proposed in an
116. Id. at 181-82.
117. NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 62.
118. Id.
119. Nicholas O'Donnell, Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional
Immunity Clarification Act: House Votes to Amend FSIA to Exclude Artwork
Loan as Basis for Jurisdiction, ART LAW REPORT (Mar. 22, 2012),
http://www.artlawreport.com/201 2 /03/22/foreign-cultural-exchange-
jurisdictional-immunity-clarification-act-house-votes-to-amend-fsia-to-exclude-
artwork-loan-as-basis-for-jurisdiction/.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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attempt to remedy the discrepancy between the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act ("FSIA") and the Immunity from Seizure Act
("IFSA").12 2  The FCEJICA was introduced by Reps. Steven
Chabot [R-OH], Steve Cohen [D-TN], John Conyers [D-MI], and
Lamar Smith [R-TX] in the House of Representative on February
24, 2012 as H.R. 4086.123 The Bill was sent to subcommittee the
same day, and received a favorable report on February 28, 2012.124
The House passed the FECJICA on March 19, 2012, and sent it to
the Senate for consideration as S.2212 on March 20, 2012.125 In
the Senate, Sens. Diane Feinstein [D-CA] and Orrin Hatch [R-UT]
co-sponsored the Bill. Four other senators joined as co-sponsors
later in the year: Sen. Charles Schumer [D-NY] on November 27,
2012, Sen. John Comyn [R-TX] on December 3, 2012, Sen.
Thomas Coburn [R-OK] on December 11, 2012, and Sen. Chris
Coons [D-DE] on December 12, 2012.126 The Bill was still in
subcommittee when the 112th Congress adjourned, and thus, the
FCEJICA died.'27
Provision (a) of FCEJICA proposes to add (h)(1) to 28 U.S.C. §
1605 (the exceptions section to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act) which would remove the lending of artwork and cultural
objects from the realm of the court's interpretation of commercial
activity of a foreign state or instrumentality under the FSIA.128
Under the FCEJICA, a loaned item would receive immunity from
jurisdiction when: (A) a work in which the foreign state is the
owner or custodian is imported into the United States for
temporary exhibition, (B) the work has received protection under
122. Id.
123. H.R. 4086: Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity
Clarification Act, GovTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr4086 (last visited Feb. 12, 2013).
124. Id.
125. Id.; S. 2212: Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity
Clarification Act, GovTRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s2212 (last visited Feb. 12, 2013).
126. GovTRACK, supra note 123.
127. Id
128. H.R. 4086, 112th Cong. §2(a)(h)(1) (2012).
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22 U.S.C. § 2459 (the Immunity From Seizure Act), and (C) notice
has been published in the Federal Register.129
The FCEJICA also proposes to add (h)(2) which, when certain
statutory criteria are satisfied, makes Nazi-era derived claims
under the FSIA expropriation exception exempt from the
protections of the reclassification afforded by the FCEJICA. This
would render qualified Nazi era claims to still be subject to
jurisdiction in the United States.'" This provision would be
implicated when a claim is based on an allegation that the work
was taken in Europe by a covered government in violation of
international law during the covered period.'' The Bill defines a
covered government as including not only the Nazi regime, but
also any governments of countries that either were occupied by
Nazi military forces, cooperated or assisted the Nazis, or allied
with the Nazi regime.13 The Bill defines the covered period as
extending from January 30, 1933 to May 8, 1945.'13 If a claim
falls within these conditions, then the foreign state or
instrumentalities lending the piece would not be exempted by the
immunity provided by the FCEJICA, and the foreign state may be
subject to jurisdiction if the court finds the lending to be a
commercial activity within the meaning of the FSIA.'34
The FCEJICA's final provision (b) dictates that the effective
date is the date of enactment, meaning that it will only apply to
civil claims made on or after that date.' The implication of this
defined effective date is that the FCEJICA cannot be applied
retroactively to claims that arose before the date of adoption.
IV. ANALYSIS
The proposed legislation essentially creates an exception to an
exception: if the loaning of artwork or cultural objects is not
129. Id. § 2(a)(h)(1)(A)-(C).
130. Id. § 2(a)(h)(2).
131. Id. § 2(a)(h)(2)(A).
132. Id. § 2(a)(h)(3)(B).
133. Id. § 2(a)(h)(3)(C).
134. H.R. 4086, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(h)(2)(C) (2012).
135. Id. § 2(b).
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considered a commercial activity, then the action of lending the
piece does not satisfy the expropriation exception of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), and as a result, fails to trigger
jurisdiction in United States courts. However, the object is only
removed from a commercial activity classification if it is granted
immunity under the Immunity From Seizure Act ("IFSA") and
notice is published.'36 If the object is not granted immunity status,
lending the piece may still be viewed as a commercial activity
under the FSIA. Additionally, since the FSIA only applies to
foreign states and instrumentalities, the Foreign Cultural Exchange
Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act ("FCEJlCA" or "Bill")
only applies to state-owned museums and institutions, not
privately owned.' Additionally, the Bill illustrates an exception
of certain objects that are not entitled to the new non-commercial
activity classification.
While the FCEJICA was not made into law this session, an
analysis of its adoption is still relevant as it is possible the Bill may
be reintroduced. This section will first address the arguments for
the adoption of the FCEJICA and the positive impacts that would
result if adopted as is. Next, the arguments for tabling FCEJICA
as proposed will be explored, as well as the consequences of its
adoption, before concluding with a discussion on why the
FCEJICA should not be made law as currently written.
A. Passing the Federal Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity
Clarification Act
The proponents' of the FCEJICA's main argument in favor of
passing the Bill is that it will encourage lending of artwork and
cultural objects from foreign nations. The proponents of the Bill
contend that as a result of the Malewicz decision, foreign
governments and museums are declining to loan works to the
United States; under Malewicz, even if the object is granted
136. Id. § 2(a)(h)(1)(B)-(C).
137. Doreen Carvajal, Dispute Over Bill to Protect Art Lent to Museums,
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/arts/design/
dispute-over-bill-to-protect-art-lent-to-museums.html? r-2&ref-design&&page
wanted=all.
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immunity under the IFSA, the museum may still be subject to
litigation.' The Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD),
who assisted Congress in drafting the FCEJICA, has specifically
stated that the result of the Malewicz case has diminished the
crucial legal protections immunity provides to works loaned to the
United States.'39 The proponents of the FCEJICA have serious
concerns that if the discrepancy between the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) and the IFSA is not resolved, future
exchanges will be severely restricted as a result of foreign states'
unwillingness to allow their objects to travel to the United
States.140
If the FCEJICA were adopted, the proponents argue, it would
repair the conflict between the FSIA and the IFSA by giving
artwork subject to IFSA's immunity protection from jurisdiction
under the FSIA when loaned to the United States. This, in turn,
would encourage more lending from foreign nations. 4 ' In support
of the FCEJICA, Senator Feinstein emphasizes the point that
temporary exhibitions that share cultural and historical works from
foreign countries not only benefit the American public, but the
United States economy as well.'42 To continue these important
exchanges, Senator Feinstein states that "[lt]his [B]ill will resolve
an unsettled issue that is making it difficult for museums and
universities to obtain works of art for temporary exhibition from
foreign countries." 43 For example, as a result of the court finding
jurisdiction in the Chabad litigation, the Russian Federation has
138. Id; H.R. REP. No. 112-413, at 2 (2012), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT- 112hrpt413/pdf/CRPT-ll 2hrpt413.pdf.
139. AAMD Statement on the Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional
Immunity Clarification Act, Ass'N ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS,
http://www.aamd.org/newsroom/documents/AAMDStatementonS2212HR4086
5-3-12.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2012).
140. H.R. REP. No. 112-413, at 2.
141. Press Release, Dianne Feinstein, Feinstein Introduces Bill to Encourage
Art Lending to American Museums (Mar. 28, 2012), available at
http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2012/3/feinstein-introduces-
bill-to-encourage-art-lending-to-american-museums.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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blocked any cultural loans to the United States.'" Some
proponents of the Bill hope that the protection and security added
by the FCEJICA may be enough to overcome the reservations
Russia and other foreign states have with loaning culturally
significant objects to the United States.145
Additionally, the FCEJICA's proponents seem to be in
agreement that the exception for Nazi-era claims is sufficient. One
proponent commented that Nazi-era claims are the most likely to
be litigated, so the exception is appropriate.'46 Another
commentator believes the Bill sufficiently protects both claimants
and the lending institutions.147  The AAMD has stated that the
special exception for only Nazi-era based claims is due to the fact
that the Holocaust was such a massive injustice that no other
situation is comparable to it, and thus, warrant special handling.'48
Overall, the proponents of the FCEJICA urge the passage of the
legislation because it will clarify the court-created discrepancy in
Malewicz between the FSIA and the IFSA, facilitate lending from
foreign museums, and sufficiently protect an aggrieved class that
justice dictates should still be able to assert their claims. There are
two important favorable results of adopting the FCEJICA and
closing the gap between the FSIA and the IFSA. First, as the
proponents believe, it is likely foreign museums will be less
hesitant to loan artworks and cultural objects to the United States.
As a result, the American public and the museums benefit from an
increased number of temporary loans from foreign museums.
Second, while there have been a few. cases were the action
144. WOUDENBERG, supra note 1, at 132; Chabad, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 9
(Chabad religious organization asserting that Russian government expropriated
documents from the organization on two separate occasions).
145. Mike Boehm, Bill Would Give Loaned Art Immunity From Seizure,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/05/
entertainment/la-et-russian-art-ban-20120404.
146. O'Donnell, supra note 119.
147. Rick St. Hilaire, The Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional
Immunity Clarification Act (S.2212) Should Be Passed, CULTURAL HERITAGE
LAWYER RICK ST. HILAIRE (Apr. 20, 2012), http://culturalheritagelawyer.
blogspot.com/2012/04/foreign-cultural-exchange.html.
148. Carvajal, supra note 137.
2013] 451
25
Shield: Curator Congress: How Proposed Legislation Adds Protection to Cul
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXIII:427
succeeds, typically the suits are superfluous, so removing the cause
of action from federal jurisdiction promotes judicial efficiency.
First and foremost, removing loaned objects from potential
litigation when they are immune from seizure will likely facilitate
more loans from foreign states and museums. Since a loaned work
(when granted immunity under the IFSA and not within the
FCEJICA exception) would be immune from both seizure and
jurisdiction, the combined protections of both acts removes the
threat of seizure or lengthy litigation when a foreign state or
institution temporarily loans an object to the United States.
Eliminating these concerns, therefore, provides foreign museums
with more security when loaning objects for temporary exhibition,
security that is lacking under the current interpretation and
application of the FSIA and the IFSA. Indeed, under the current
interpretation, it has been suspected that several museums have
been more hesitant to loan artworks to the United States because of
the threat of seizure or litigation.149 If more foreign nations and
institutions readily lend works to the United States, then the
American public will directly benefit by viewing culturally
significant objects in person at United States museums and
institutions. As a result of this potentially increased attendance,
United States museums and institutions will receive economic
benefits that they can use to continue the protection, preservation,
and promotion of cultural heritage.
The FCEJICA also solves a perplexing judicial efficiency
problem. Since the judicially-expanded interpretation of
commercial activity within the meaning of the FSIA expropriation
exception includes temporary exhibition loans to museums, the
United States courts have become a common forum for restitution
cases.'so This increase in restitution litigation is tangled by the
paradox between the FSIA and the IFSA. Under the current
interpretation and application of the FSIA and the IFSA, loaned
works may only receive immunity from seizure but not from
jurisdiction. This means that a claim can still potentially be
litigated against the owner of the object in dispute under the FSIA,
but if the object is subject to IFSA immunity from seizure, then the
149. Carvajal, supra note 137.
150. O'Donnell, supra note 119.
452
26
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss2/6
CURATOR CONGRESS
object cannot be attached to the litigation. Therefore, in a
restitution claim, the object for which ownership is sought cannot
be attached to the litigation. Consequently, even if the restitution
claim succeeds and the plaintiff is awarded title, the court may not
be able to seize the property. This illustrates the fundamental flaw
that results from the discrepancy between the FSIA and the IFSA.
By eliminating the FSIA restitution cause of action when an object
is immune under the IFSA, the FCEJICA eliminates the
discrepancy in the laws while also conserving judicial time and
resources. If there can be no jurisdiction, and therefore no
litigation about a piece, then the court will not be tied up in
international cases that (1) may sour diplomatic relations, (2) have
few connections to the United States, and (3) require time-
consuming determinations of remedies since the object cannot be
seized by the court and returned to the owner.
All in all, if the FCEJICA were adopted as currently proposed,
the United States museums and public would benefit from more
cooperative cultural object loaning that gives foreign nations
greater security in their loans, and judicial efficiency would be
promoted by eliminating fruitless litigation.
B. Tabling the Federal Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity
Clarification Act
There is strong opposition to the adoption of the FCEJICA,
particularly from the Lawyer's Committee for Cultural Heritage
Preservation ("LCCHP") and Saving Antiquities for Everyone
("SAFE"). While the opponents seem to agree that the
discrepancy between the FSIA and the IFSA should be resolved,
they object to the narrow-tailoring of the Nazi-era exception.'
The opponents argue that the exception is too narrow for a number
of reasons.
First, the exception requires the artwork be lost to Nazi agents.
However, Nazis did not seize the art of many Jewish families.
Rather, Nazi persecution forced these families to sell their art
below market value because they were forced to flee, a
151. Carvajal, supra note 137.
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circumstance seen in Orkin v. Switzerland.152 Additionally, by
limiting the takings to only Axis associated governments and
agents, the FCEJICA ignores claims resulting from takings by
agents of the Allied associated governments - the Act does not
provide jurisdiction for claims based off takings from the United
States' allies, e.g. Britain, France, etc.'15  The date restriction of
May 8, 1945 may also be too narrow, opponents argue: some
German soldiers were still returning home after that date, and thus,
still had the opportunity to loot.15 4 The FCEJICA fails to protect
objects taken in these situations.
Furthermore, opponents argue that the limitation to only Nazi-
era claims is severely flawed. Because the Bill only gives a
special limitation to European based Nazi-era claims, takings
claims from such times as the Bolshevik Revolution or Cambodian
Civil War are left with no chance of recovery if the FCEJICA is
adopted.'55  Instead, the opponents urge for a blanket exception
common to all looted art, rather than an enumeration of one
limited group. 156 Opponents argue that the increase in illegal
excavation of antiquities and the black market for stolen artwork
supports this position.'15  Essentially, opponents believe that while
the exception for Nazi-era claims is a step in the right direction, it
is simply too narrow, and eliminates the rights of many parties that
are the victims of looting of artworks or cultural objects.
Overall, the opponents argue that the FCEJICA's narrow focus
creates loopholes for Nazi-era claims and does not provide
152. Carvajal, supra note 137; Orkin, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 614 (Jewish
woman in Spain sold Van Gogh artwork below market value to gain funds to
escape Nazi forces).
153. Nikki Georgopulos, Revisiting Senate Bill 2212, Part One, PLUNDERED
ART: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE HOLOCAUST ART RESTITUTION PROJECT (Oct.
18, 2012), http://plundered-art.blogspot.com/2012/10/revisiting-senate-bill-
2212part-one.html.
154. Id.
155. Carvajal, supra note 137.
156. Id.
157. Nikki Georgopulos, Revisiting Senate Bill 2212, Part Two, PLUNDERED
ART: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE HOLOCAUST ART RESTITUTION PROJECT (Nov.
10, 2012), http://plundered-art.blogspot.com/2012/11/revisiting-senate-bill-
2212-part-two.html.
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sufficient protection to all looting victims. If the FCEJICA were
adopted as currently proposed, there would likely be two
unwelcome results. Not only does the Bill's Nazi-era exception
operate to bars claims that American jurisprudence and justice
dictate should be heard, but the FCEJICA does not remedy the
Russian Federation loan embargo.
While the FECJICA's exception for Nazi-era claims means that
some claims can still be remedied, the narrow-tailoring of the
exception ignores many other possible restitution claims.
Certainly the Nazi-era exception is a significant step in the right
direction (indeed, it is unlikely that the FCEJICA would pass
without it), however it operates to bar other restitution claims that
arrive from other egregious events. By limiting restitution to only
the enumerated Nazi-era claims, the FCEJICA skews other takings
claims as of less value, thus illustrating that the United States
views some claims as more worthy of protection than others, that
other injustices are not equal to and less abhorrent than Nazi-era
injustices. This understanding of the exception is in direct conflict
with the American principle of equality, which along with justice
and fairness, are building blocks in the United States. Therefore,
American jurisprudence guides the judiciary to hear all takings
claims arising from injustices equally, rather than limit themselves
to only claims arising from a single unjust event.
Additionally, adoption of the FCEJICA would not assuage the
Russian Federation's embargo on artwork and cultural objects to
the United States. As a result of the Chabad litigation, the Russian
Federation refuses to make any loans from Russian state-owned
museums and institutions to the United States."' However, in
Chabad, the items had not even been sent to the United States
when the litigation occurred.' Even without the objects
physically being in the United States, the court still found
sufficient commercial activity to allow jurisdiction under the
expropriation exception.'6 0 This means the court found jurisdiction
in a commercial activity other than the actual temporary exhibition
or display of the objects in the United States. Thus, the
158. WOUDENBERG, supra note 1, at 132.
159. Agudas Chasidei Chabad, 466 F. Supp. at 12-13.
160. Agudas Chasidei Chabad, 528 F.3d at 955.
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FCEJICA's classification of temporary exhibition or display as an
insufficient commercial activity is inapplicable to the conflict with
the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation was offended that
they were subject to suit without even loaning the objects out;
therefore, a Bill that makes loans immune from suit when they are
in the United States is largely irrelevant to the Russian Federation.
Because the FCEJICA does not actually address the underlying
reason why the Russian Federation will not make loans to the
United States, it is not a remedy to the loan embargo. In fact, the
Russian Embassy in Washington D.C. has stated that the Bill does
not adequately address their concerns.16 '
If the FCEJICA were tabled as currently proposed, it would be
because the narrowly-tailored exception bars claims that American
philosophy fundamentally dictates United States courts should
hear, and because the Bill is essentially irrelevant to unfreezing
Russia's loan embargo.
C. Should the current Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional
Immunity Clarification Act be adopted or revised?
As currently proposed, the FCEJICA should not be adopted
because of two fatal flaws that undermine the intention to facilitate
cultural loans to the United States. First, only having the narrow
exception for Nazi era claims unintentionally sends the poor
diplomatic message that the United States does not view other
worldwide injustices as significant as the Holocaust. Second,
while the intention of the FCEJICA is well meant, the application
of the FCEJICA as proposed inadvertently demonstrates to foreign
states that United States views the exhibition of stolen cultural
objects as more important than the preservation and protection of
cultural heritage.
The Nazi-era exception is necessary and a good start, but the
limited scope does not sufficiently address the severe injustices
that occur worldwide. The reasoning that only Nazi-era claims
should receive protection because of the Holocaust's level of
injustice and egregiousness is parallel to few other events does not
sufficiently support the narrow exception. Certainly, the
161. Boehm, supra note 145.
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Holocaust was horrific at all levels, but enumerating this single
injustice fails to acknowledge other devastating and offensive
injustices suffered worldwide. Foreign nations could construe this
oversight as United States insensitivity, that other injustices are
simply not significant enough to warrant protection. While this is
not the intention for the exception, unfortunately, this is a
possibility.
Therefore, the question becomes what the proper scope of the
FCEJICA should be. On one side of the spectrum, there could be
no exceptions whatsoever, and thus, bar the grant of jurisdiction
under the FSIA for all restitution claims of stolen cultural objects
that have been exhibited in the Untied States. However, even
more so than the proposed exception, this limit runs against the
foundations of American justice. In addition, a Bill without any
exceptions would have a difficult time in Congress, and would
have a very low chance of garnering enough support to pass. On
the other end, there could be a blanket exception to all takings in
violation of international law, but this would undermine the entire
intent of the FCEJICA. A blanket exception would essentially
mirror the exception in the FSIA, therefore making the entire
FCEJICA redundant and unnecessary.'62 With this type of general
blanket exception, the FCEJICA protects the same amount of
claims the FSIA does, and thus, would fail to make the necessary
clarification between the FSIA and IFSA.
Secondly, the application of the Bill as currently proposed
would send a poor message about the conduct of American
162. As discussed, the Malewicz decision means that the FSIA expropriation
exception gives courts jurisdiction over foreign states when state-owned
institutions loan an object that has been taken in violation of international law
because the loan is a sufficient commercial activity. See supra text
accompanying note 118. If the FCEJICA sets forth that loans from foreign
state-owned institutions are not a sufficiently commercial activity, but also has a
blanket exception for all property that was taken in violation of international
law, then the court would have jurisdiction over any loan from a foreign state-
owned institution of an expropriated object because it would still be considered
a sufficient commercial activity. Therefore, the application of both laws would
be identical (albeit perhaps with different presumptions and burdens of proof):
courts have jurisdiction over foreign states when their institutions loan property
that was taken in violation of international law.
2013] 457
31
Shield: Curator Congress: How Proposed Legislation Adds Protection to Cul
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXIII:427
museums and institutions to foreign nations. The Bill in its current
form would enable American museums and institutions to
knowingly display artwork or cultural objects known to be stolen
or taken without fair compensation. This underlying message is
fundamentally not in accordance with United States policy to
protect and preserve cultural heritage.' Because the Bill
eliminates any cause of action for victims of looting outside of the
Nazi-era exception, it follows that United States museums do not
have to worry about the true ownership of the works loaned from
foreign state-owned museums that are under the IFSA's protection.
Therefore, the opponents argue, United States museums may
display works on loan from foreign states that the museum knows
were obtained illegally.'" If United States museums displayed
knowingly taken works and objects, regardless of the cultural
significance, the integrity of the museum may be severely
undermined. Additionally, this type of conduct would demonstrate
that the United States is more concerned with displaying works
and objects for the American public's benefit, rather than
protecting the cultural significance of the work by recognizing the
rightful owner and providing them an opportunity to regain their
property. Although the exhibition of an item may be beneficial to
the American public, such exhibition of looted works would
subvert the United States' dedication to preserving and protecting
cultural heritage. Therefore, while the United States has a
significant interest in promoting cultural education and
preservation, there must be a cost-benefit analysis of how to satisfy
this interest. Under this type of analysis, the United States should
examine what kind of benefit the exchange provides for the
American public, as well as the costs of not protecting the rights of
true owners whose property was expropriated for its cultural
significance. However, the FCEJICA fails to factor in this
analysis and instead only facilitates exhibitions of cultural objects
to the detriment of cultural heritage protection.
163. United States Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity
Clarification Act, SAFE SAVING ANTIQUITIES FOR EVERYONE,
http://www.savingantiquities.org/our-work/advocacy/s-2212/ (last visited Nov.
29, 2012).
164. Id.
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In sum, while the FCEJICA is a good start towards protecting
temporary artwork and cultural object loans from foreign states to
the United States, the Bill has some significant flaws that must be
remedied before considering adoption. Significantly, the Bill's
exception must be re-tailored to include more than Nazi era claims
because the single, narrow exception sends a poor diplomatic
message. Additionally, the Bill must strike a balance between the
goal of preserving and protecting cultural heritage and the United
States' desire to educate the public through exhibitions of foreign
culturally significant objects.
V. CONCLUSION
The court's decision in Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam that
temporary exhibitions of culturally significant objects was
sufficient to confer jurisdiction to United States courts under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) turned the practice of
loaning foreign works on its head. This holding created a
discrepancy between the FSIA and the Immunity From Seizure
Act (IFSA) that objects on temporary loan may not be seized if
granted protection under the IFSA, yet still may be subject to
jurisdiction under the FSIA. This disconnect threatens the
willingness of foreign states to loan items to United States
museums and institutions, and must be remedied in order to protect
the future of foreign states loaning of art and cultural objects to the
United States. Without adequate protection provided to these
objects, foreign states will not want to risk sending their items to
the United States, and the American public will suffer from the
inability to observe and appreciate the cultural heritage of the
world. While the Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional
Immunity Clarification Act (FCEJICA) was a necessary first
attempt to cure the inconsistency between the FSIA and IFSA and
to preserve the future of foreign art loans to the United States, the
Bill falls short of an appropriate solution.
The fundamental battle in the FCEJICA boils down to a line-
drawing issue. While American justice would favor United States
courts to have jurisdiction over all takings claims, it is impossible
for the courts to provide justice to all international takings claims.
Litigating every takings claim of this type would not only tie up
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valuable judicial resources, but may also chill foreign relations,
such as in Chabad. Thus, an acceptable solution must contain an
exception whose line is drawn somewhere in the middle between
narrow and limited claims and all claims. A possible solution
would be an exception that still provides jurisdiction to restitution
claims arising from a seizure in violation of international law
during a time of political turmoil or social injustice.'6 5 This
exception would enable jurisdiction to Nazi-era claims, but also to
other claims from egregious historical events. This exception also
would comport with the American justice system's design to
provide a remedy to such injustices.
However, this proposed exception would also have an additional
requirement: that United States jurisdiction be contingent on the
status of the claim in the nation that executed the taking. In
practice, this would mean that a claim would only receive
jurisdiction if (1) the takings claim is not barred in the foreign
State the taking took place in, and (2) the claim has exhausted all
remedies in that jurisdiction to no avail. Thus, if a claim were
barred in that foreign state due to statute of limitations or the like,
the United States courts would not have jurisdiction over the
claim. Additionally, if the claim was allowed, and the remedies
available in the foreign state have not been exhausted, the United
States courts would not have jurisdiction over the claim. The
function of these additional requirements would be to conserve
judicial resources by limiting takings claims to viable claims that
have no other option. As a whole, this type of exception would
make the United States courts a last chance option for claims that
are still recognized by law but have not reached a justicable result
in the foreign state. Overall, an exception of this nature would
both strike a balance between the American sense of justice and
the promotion of judicial efficiency.
Even without legislation in place to remedy the divide between
the FSIA and the IFSA, the United States should aim to only
facilitate the loan of cultural objects that benefit the American
public and are not tainted by a foreign nation's violation of law.
165. 1 would propose that "political turmoil" means a period where
government was overthrown, challenged, or nonfunctional, and "social
injustice" means a crime against humanity that shocks the conscious.
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The United States government is currently equipped to handle a
determination of whether or not to facilitate the loan of a cultural
object, and has established an avenue to analyze whether an object
is tainted by theft or seizure. As is, the Department of State
examines the loan of artwork when the foreign nation applies for
immunity under the IFSA. Indeed, after Portrait of Wally, it is
standard practice for a foreign nation to only loan an artwork or
cultural object after securing immunity under the IFSA.'66
Therefore, the step in application for immunity under the IFSA
that requires a statement of ownership can be expanded to require
one additional step: a history of ownership. When a foreign nation
applies for immunity for an object under IFSA, the Department of
State could require them to provide documentation of the history
of ownership of the object in addition to the information already
required. If the Department of State feels that a history is
suspicious or fabricated, they can either investigate further or
simply reject the immunity application. The FCEJICA could aid
the Department of State with this determination if a provision was
added that called upon them to use due diligence in their search,
and set forth that immunity should be denied wherever there is the
slightest doubts surrounding the cultural object. While this means
that some culturally significant works may not reach the American
public, it has two other implications that outweigh the loss to the
American public.
First, it puts foreign states on notice that the United States does
not condone the taking or theft of culturally significant objects.
By denying immunity to such objects, the United States sends a
message that while the importance of viewing cultural objects and
the preservation of cultural heritage are recognized, the benefits
will not be at the cost of illegal actions by foreign nations. By
requiring foreign nations to document the history of ownership of
an object when applying for immunity, the Department of State
conveys that the United States does not condone illegal takings
and thefts, and will not allow the nation to benefit from such
actions. Thus, by adding a vetting requirement, the United States
sends the positive message to foreign nations that such illegal
166. O'Donnell, supra note 119.
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takings are not condoned and will not be encouraged, even if they
benefit society.
The protection afforded to cultural objects loaned from foreign
states to the United States currently sits in a precarious position,
and the future of such loans is severely threaten unless a long-term
solution is reached soon. While the FCEJICA was the first attempt
to preserving these cultural heritage loans, unfortunately it fell
short of a complete solution and died in a Senate subcommittee.
However, with proper analysis and careful revisions, there is still
hope that the Bill may be reintroduced successfully. The
enactment of appropriate corrective legislation would not only
resolve the worries currently plaguing foreign lenders, but also
enable the American public to be enriched by the diverse and
extraordinary cultural history of the world.
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